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Abstract
In today’s sport industry there is a push by players to maintain an
equitable split in revenues to ensure ownership groups do not exploit them.
This has been of particular importance over the past five years during
collective bargaining agreements. Players associations are not the only
groups who are affected by the financial management of professional sport
owners. Taxpayers and local governments also share an interest in the
manner owners operate teams. With an increase in public subsidization of
sport teams, taxpayers have a natural vested concern for professional sports.
The concern on this topic comes with the financial management of
professional sport teams by owners. There are documented uses of creative
accounting practices by owners, which fatten their wallets while often times
taking advantage of players, taxpayers, and local governments alike. Owners
hide revenues and certain expenses to paint a picture of poor financial team
health to the three parties in order to maximize player salary efficiency and
public subsidization.
In an attempt to correct the current need owners feel to utilize
creative accounting practices, this thesis developed a regression analysis to
understand how their fans respond to cost structure of player contracts. As
detailed in the latter portion of the thesis, fans of the MLB, NBA, and MLS all
respond differently to salary structures; proposing a solution to increasing
player cost efficiency.
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Executive Summary
This thesis has two main goals: to investigate and discuss the creative
accounting practices used by owners in professional sport and propose a
solution for owners to decrease the use of these generally unethical
accounting practices. Over the past decade the accounting side of sport has
become increasingly important. The National Football League, Major League
Baseball, National Basketball Association, and National Hockey League have
restructured their collective bargaining agreements in this period. The
collective bargaining agreements, just like in the remainder of American
commerce, govern the relations between the employers and employees; in
sport it is the owners and players respectively.
The two major pieces of discussion in professional sport collective
bargaining agreements are the revenue sharing and player compensation
models. Although they are two separate ideas, they are collaborative and
equally important pieces for player associations. For revenue sharing there
are different models and means of equalizing the distribution of revenues in
the league amongst the teams. Revenue sharing relates to a certain
percentage of the teams’ revenues being dispersed in a general pool. These
revenues are generally split, based on need, to lower revenue-producing
teams. Generally low revenue teams exist because of several reasons
including: population and income of the region, team history, tradition of
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winning, and exciting players. All of these serve as drivers in fan affinity for a
team.
Usually teams are required to share the revenues less the operational
expenses into the pool and receive a certain percentage back. The concern in
this structure is that larger revenue team owners will attempt to expense out
more revenues into their pockets and thereby sharing less of this profit. The
purpose of revenue sharing is to create competitive balance in the league.
Competitive balance is where teams start to bring in equal bottom-line
profits and any single team could have the financial opportunity to win a
championship in a given year. This is not ideal for large revenue teams since
they are required to give more to the general pool and will receive back the
same amount a low revenue team who puts less into the pot. Therefore
owners across the board and different leagues have used creative accounting
practices to share less in their own interest.
These accounting practices are important in the second piece of
collective bargaining agreements: player compensation. All leagues
traditionally, except the MLB, have some sort of “cap” on the amount teams
can spend on their total roster of players. A cap, as the name implies, creates
a ceiling for team spending to drive a competitive balance in the league by no
one team drastically outspending the league average for player salary.
The NBA, for example, has a soft cap, which once exceeded taxes the
team. The soft cap tax is put into the general pool for revenue sharing, but
simultaneously allows for a team to theoretically spend large sums in hopes
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to drive wining-percentage or fan based revenues. The NFL however has a
hard cap that teams cannot surpass. Teams often structure contracts in
order to fit into this cap; maybe they will pay a player less one year allowing
them to pay a different player more in that same year.
In collective bargaining agreements, players and their
associations/unions aim to increase the caps on player compensation as high
as possible. The owners generally tend to want to decrease the amount they
are required to spend on talent while maximizing revenues from ticket,
merchandise, and sponsorship sales. Revenue sharing allows all teams to
spend equal sums on players. With shared revenues, low revenue teams can
now maximize their spending under a certain cap. This again gives wealthy
owners a reason to decrease reported revenues in order to maximize their
personal profits while winning at the highest percentage.
Owners are known for consistently lamenting over their teams’
financial instabilities. This has huge implications for taxpayers and local
governments. Due to the local and regional importance of professional
sports teams in economics and socially, local governments tend to help these
teams in any way possible. This thesis cites examples where state and city
governments are lending or giving large sums of money to support stadium
constructions and renovations. In San Francisco, for example, a city council
created a private group with the same name to borrow money from Goldman
Sachs, to fund $950 million intended for the new 49ers football stadium. The
San Francisco 49ers will act as tenants in the stadium. However, if yearly
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payments are not met to pay back the lender, it is likely the taxpayers will be
the back-up source of funding. These types of stories have been rampant
throughout the past decade in the professional sport teams. This, along with
tax breaks and special deals for owners and teams, make profits easier to
come upon for these owners. Local governments have expectations of
owners financially, anticipating a giveback to the municipalities and states
supporting their teams. The main issue with the expectations is a team is
likely to pack up camp and move to a new city where they can retain more of
their revenues. For a number of reasons, including city excitement and the
glamor of having a professional sport team, many cities want to host a team.
More cities want to host teams than there are teams to be spread around.
This allows owners and leagues to create financial leverage in most
situations because of the high demand for hosting professional sport teams.
All of these situations in the current professional sport financial
models give owners easy avenues to attempt creative, and at times unethical,
ways to maximize their revenues. The last section of the thesis looks to
create a solution to this paradigm. Through quantitative analysis the goal
was to test for fan preferences as it relates to player spending. If owners can
understand how to maximize ticket sales (generally an unshared revenue)
through player salary optimization, then the hope is they may decrease their
creative accounting habits and perceived need for public subsidization. This
quantitative analysis will provide a means of increased efficiency for player
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spending by owners, and therefore less need for creative accounting
practices.
This thesis explains, in depth, the collective bargaining models of each
of the big four professional sport leagues, and how owners are, in a way,
exploiting the revenue-expense systems to their benefit. Not only does this
have implications for players associated with the collective bargaining
agreements, but also has meant a great deal to taxpayers and local
governments. With a potential solution for owners to maximize revenue
through fan preferences, there is a hope to decrease creative accounting
practices and the stream of public subsidization.
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Setting the Owners’ Stage
“That $27.6 million net loss looks bad, but, as you'll see, it's an illusion
— a trick of accounting, one practiced by every sports franchise with the full
blessing of American tax law and one we should keep in mind whenever an
owner pleads poverty (Craggs, 2011).” Sport Writer Tommy Craggs
introduces the concept of professional sport owners utilizing creative
accounting practices to maximize their personal profits; this is the focal point
of the thesis. With serious implications for players (in collective bargaining
agreements), taxpayers, and local governments alike, there will be an aim to
investigate, understand, and propose a potential alternative to these creative
accounting practices.
Sport is a unique piece of modern culture. More than ever, sport
brings different people together in different settings. From LeBron James’s
athleticism as he leaps through the air for a resplendent dunk, to hundreds of
thousands of people coming together on an international scale for the 2014
Boston Marathon in support of those lost in the previous year’s event, sport
is an unparalleled event. The combination of the skill, passion, and
enthusiasm of participants and enthusiasts alike is not visible in any other
professional enterprise.
Professional sport owners can connect the emotions associated with
sport teams and cities with the business side of sport to capitalize. This
creates a need to grasp the whole picture of the owners’ reach. In particular,
as noted in the initial quote, how do accounting practices not only change the
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face of the sport industry, but also how do these practices affect the
American population as a whole? Even though professional sport is a
business where the ultimate goal is to generate bottom-line profits for the
owners and investors, it is of particular importance to understand how
owners and players can create an equitable and mutually beneficial
relationship while showing respect to the passion and money of fans. Over
time most American businesses have created an equilibrium, or at least an
agreeable system, to maximize utility for the employer, employees, and
consumers; however, starting in the middle of the 20th century there was a at
which owners began tightening their grip on the monetary flow associated
with professional sport.
Owners progressively have looked for ways to benefit their wallets,
which hurt several different parties including: players, small market and lowincome teams/owners, local governments, and taxpayers. This thesis will
aim to tell these stories, while suggesting a way to curve the issue of profit
sharing. Additionally the hope is to potentially value a franchise, which will
help create a model for sharing the profits with the affected parties.
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An Historical Perspective and Creative Practices
Despite professional sport leagues and affiliated teams being
considered businesses under the American laws that govern commerce,
there have been particular laws and precedents putting professional sport in
a different legal consideration than ordinary business. Investigating these
precedents helps to understand how owners have recently strengthened
their grip on the monetary flow of sport.
One such case occurred in 1959 when Bill Veeck, the former owner of
the Cleveland Indians, argued to the IRS that once professional athletes have
been paid, they begin to “waste away” or depreciate in value. This is a
common term in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), however
in commerce depreciation is not used for employees. Veeck, through this
roster depreciation allowance (RDA), hoped to depreciate his roster like any
other asset such as an office copy machine, a company car, and a farmer’s
cattle (Craggs, 2011). All of these have logical decreases in value over time: a
copy machine has a definitive useful life, the company car will break down
with usage, and cattle become less valuable with age. There is a need for
depreciation in these cases because of a depletion of the asset capacity.
Under GAAP businesses should use a conservative mindset. A player,
however, is unique and different from depreciable assets. Players can
become more valuable or less valuable, depending on a couple of aspects.
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For example, if the Seattle Seahawks of the NFL signed a young running back
to a five-year, $20 million contract, this gives the belief that the market has
the player valued to the franchise and the rest of the league at $4 million per
year. If the running back has a great season the market value of the player
increases; then the Seahawks could in theory trade the player at the end of
the season for more than the remaining value of $16 million on the contract.
Additionally, if the running back has a spectacular season the team is likely to
realize increased revenue in ticket and merchandise sales.
It is true, in this scenario, the running back could have a disappointing
season and not be worth the $4 million spent over the season. Under this
thought, it does seem logical for the team to note depreciation on their asset,
and Veeck has a point.
Generally players equal or exceed the contract value, more often than
coming short. If the player can be anticipated to equal or exceed the value of
$4 million to the team more often than be of less value, wouldn’t then the
conservative mindset be not depreciating the value of the player? Even
though the player is generally as valuable on the market after the season,
Veeck made it possible for teams to recognize two expenses, the depreciation
expense and the salary expense associated with the player. This is not only
important for taxation purposes but, as the story will expand upon
throughout the paper, players and taxpayers will be affected.
When Veeck generated this idea, “the IRS not only agreed with Veeck
but allowed any owner claiming the write-off to deduct roster expenses twice
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— first under "player salaries," … and then under "loss on players' contracts"
— and an enormous tax shelter sprang up within the balance sheets of
franchises everywhere (Craggs, 2011).” Questions do arise because a team’s
roster at a particular point in time is not actually depreciating. Some players
fade in value with age, while others are developing and improving. Teams
will not, however, pay more taxes if a player becomes more valuable.
Accounting practices hold a conservative mindset, where the lesser of the
cost of an asset or the fair market value is the distinction in expected losses.
In accordance with this mindset gains are not reported until they are
actualized. “Given this however in the now, owners are taxed less and aren’t
taxed for selling or trading the player later on (Craggs, 2011).”
Owners attempt to bring the most money back to their pockets
through several financial management strategies. In addition to player
depreciation, owners find other practices to misrepresent the fiscal health of
their teams. One such example is the practice of owners receiving salaries,
which are counted as businesses expenses that decrease team profits. “In the
NFL, some owners have paid themselves ‘salaries’ as high as $7.5 million
(Hunt, 2011).” George Steinbrenner, famous former owner of the New York
Yankees, in the early 1980s infamously paid himself a “consulting fee” of $25
million for the negotiation of the Yankees’ cable contract (TS, 2009).
This is continued with owners creating new related businesses
related to their teams. Two particular examples of related businesses
creating additional revenues for the owners are the New York Yankees and
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Cleveland Indians. The YES (Yankees Entertainment and Sports) Network,
which is owned by the same holding company of the Yankees, produces
revenues for the ownership group and not directly for the Yankees. This
network uses Yankees and Brooklyn Nets media content to stimulate
sponsorship and fan revenues.
Cleveland Indians Baseball LP does not own Sports Time Ohio, but
instead the majority owner of the Indians, Larry Dolan, personally owns
Sports Time Ohio. “Because the two are legally separate entities, Cleveland
Indians Baseball LP has no incentive or obligation to factor the profits of
Sports Time Ohio into the franchise’s accounting picture (TS, 2009).”
Both the Yankees and Indians’ ownership groups see the revenues
from television rights associated with the teams. However with this
structure the team itself does not see the revenue and, therefore, will not
become shared revenue. This is just one example of how the owners of a
team can benefit themselves through related businesses.
Another way owners can tweak their profit stream to appear weaker
financially is in the selling and buying of a franchise. This could play out in
several ways often relating to interest associated with loans.
The prospective team owner first creates a new ownership
corporation. He then loans money to the company, which uses the
loan as a down payment to buy the team. This loan, plus the interest
payments, then has to be repaid to the owner from the subsequent
income of the team, which lowers the team’s stated profit. Once again,
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the owner pockets the money, and the accounting department records
it as an expense (Eitzen, 2000).
The owners will create limited liability corporations or limited partnerships
to purchase and operate their franchises through loans from the personal
finances of the owner. As stated by Eitzen, the operating profits are repaid to
the owner plus interest over the span of the next several years.
These strategic accounting practices used by owners serve to
maximize owners’ profits. The examples discussed are just a small portion of
the many scenarios affecting the public perceived team financial stability, but
when extrapolated throughout all teams in all four of the major professional
sport leagues the implications of harm done to players and taxpayers is
apparent.
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Collective Bargaining, Revenue Sharing, and Salary Caps
The accounting models and practices have become of particular
importance over the past decade as all of the major professional sport
leagues have restructured their Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs).
These CBAs, which like other unionized businesses, govern the relationship
between the owner and players. An important piece of the CBA is revenue
sharing models among the teams. Among the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL
revenue sharing standardizes the flow of revenues. The “big four” sport
leagues each have their own definitions dictating that the particular revenues
of teams go into a shared pot, while other revenues remain local and with the
team. Generally this pot of shared revenues aims to raise competitive
balance throughout the league, meaning any team has the resources or the
opportunity to win a championship in a given year. This means high
revenue teams are giving a percentage of their revenues to low revenue
teams, who are conventionally also small-market teams. The hope with
revenue sharing is that through revenue redistribution the league as a whole
can increase in value, helping each team into the black.
Through a league-controlled revenue sharing, all teams are given the
opportunity to spend equally on talented players to increase revenues such
as ticket, merchandise, and sponsorship sales. Leagues have, in parallel
instituted salary caps to control the amount teams can spend on rosters.
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Salary caps become the second important piece of the collective bargaining
agreement conversation. Each league has different rules to govern how
teams spend their money on talent to maximize profits (revenue after
expenses). The salary caps work to guide teams in spending local and shared
revenues on talent acquisition to optimize fan interest and their bottom lines.
Owners however are not as concerned with fan interest and the
teams’ bottom lines as they are with their own profits. This opens the door
for owners to utilize creative accounting practices similar to the one Veeck
created in roster depreciation allowance. Each league has their own story of
different owners creating expenses to have teams appear financially weak.
This perceived instability not only affects revenue sharing and player
compensation but can also skew the tax dollar flow between owners and
local governments. Tax streams, discussed later in the thesis, afford owners
further opportunities to use creative accounting practices for their benefit.
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Understanding the Spread
Each league has its own models for revenue sharing and salary cap
restrictions aiming to control owner actions, and therefore each league has
its own stories of owners circumventing sharing to take home additional
profits. As stated above these practices by owners can affect players and
fellow teams.
“In the 2009-2010 seasons, the Big Four, which includes the National
Football League (“NFL”), National Hockey League (“NHL”), Major League
Baseball (“MLB”), and National Basketball Association (“NBA”), generated
over $21.6 billion in revenues (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).” Scholars
Dietl, Grossmann, and Lang further state these revenues are governed by,
“…each league’s respective collective bargaining agreement, which
establishes a player compensation system and a revenue sharing model
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).” The purpose of the revenue sharing is for
a tighter range of payroll spending, preventing the large market teams from
monopolizing the flow of high-priced free agents.
When discussing collective bargaining agreements, the ideas of
revenue sharing, player compensation/salary caps, and taxes are separate
ideas but are, in fact, inextricably linked. Revenue sharing and salary cap
restrictions are the two points for particular concern under the notion of a
collective bargaining agreement. The way these two are governed under
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collective bargaining agreements differs amongst the major leagues in the
U.S.
Revenue sharing concerns itself with the league creating revenue
streams and requiring its teams to share those streams based upon different
standards established by each league individually. Generally speaking,
shared revenues primarily include television rights, ticket sales, and
merchandise sales. The shared revenues are intended to help the lower
income and small market franchises create a competitive balance throughout
the league.
Specifically there are two main goals revenue sharing is designed to
accomplish through the redistribution of revenue: first to ensure the league
as a whole is in the black (profitable), and to second ensure the big and small
market teams are on a level playing field. David Stern, former commissioner
of the National Basketball Association, stated, "It's about coming up with a
system, if you think about it, where every team has the same amount of
chips" (Coon, 2012).
Revenue sharing is a layered idea. It reflects a question constantly
facing the American economy at large, should those who make more money
share their profits with those who make less? Across professional sports it
has become generally accepted that it is, in fact, better for the league as a
whole to share the majority of revenue streams. Sport is a different type of
business where teams need each other to play and generate revenues. This
makes solving the above question more layered.
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The traditional model regarding revenue sharing and competitive
balance recognizes a dulling effect. This idea, discussed and refuted by Justin
Hunt, states that, “according to the dulling effect, revenue sharing reduces
the incentives for clubs to invest in playing talent (Hunt, 2011).” The dulling
effect argues this is because each club, “has to share some of the resulting
marginal benefits of its talent investment with the other clubs in the league
(Hunt, 2011).”
Hunt instead asserts, and proves through mathematical analysis, that
rather there is a “sharpening effect” in revenue sharing. With this sharpening
effect large-market teams benefit from the underdog sharing in the total
league revenue. Sharing creates a more competitively balanced league where
marginal revenue has been shown to increase up to a certain equilibrium
point. There is a point in cross-subsidization for each league where overall
utility is maximized through profits and wins. Each league attacks this aim of
maximization and the totals designated to the players’ share in a different
manner.
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NFL Revenue Sharing and SRS
The National Football League is seen to have the most successful
revenue sharing and salary cap model of the big four major leagues in the
United States. At the same time, though, the NFL revenue sharing is the least
complex of the big four and states its purpose is to ensure every club
distributions equitable totals from designated sources of revenue. The NFL’s
revenue sharing model has a long history. However, two relatively recent
events significantly shaped the current practice, and further created what is
seen as unshared revenue.
First in 1995, Jerry Jones, owner and face of the Dallas Cowboys (often
referred to as America’s Team), challenged NFL Properties as the exclusive
rights holder of national sponsorships and marketing agreements for
additional, unshared streams of localized revenue. This helped create a
divide for NFL franchises between local, unshared sponsorship dollars and
national, shared marketing totals, which affected the amount of revenue
distributed. The NFL controls the official national sponsors, such as PepsiCo
being the official beverage of the NFL, while teams control local sponsorship
streams, such as X insurance being an official sponsor of the Dallas Cowboys.
Jerry Jones succeeded in his challenge and created this separation between
national and local revenues.
In addition, to this adjustment there was a restructuring of incentives
for private-public financing strategies in the 2001 and again in the 2006
collective bargaining agreements. The restructuring made it more profitable
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for franchises to either build new stadiums or have arena renovations. After
the amendments in the 2001 and 2006 collective bargaining agreements,
teams were incentivized for making these changes to their stadiums because
they wouldn’t share new revenues from luxury box, club seat, or personal
seat licenses (Hunt, 2011). Personal seat licenses (PSL) are a consumer tax
where fans are given the right to purchase a particular seat and season
tickets to that seat. These fans are given preferential treatment year after
year, however generally must renew their licenses each year. The shift for
increased percentages of luxury box and club seating, as well as PSLs, in
stadium structure often times out-prices the average fan from attending
multiple games. Luxury box, club seating, and PSL revenues have become
more important, though, over the past ten years with a boom in stadium
revitalizations and construction because as an unshared revenue owners will
work to maximize these profits to help their bottom-lines.
The NFL breaks down its shared and non-shared revenues as follows:

25

Table 1: Designation of revenues for revenue sharing and the salary cap
Category
Gate Receipts
Broadcasts
Concessions
Local Advertising
Signage
Local Sponsors
Parking
Novelties
NFL Entities
Barter Income
3rd Party Stadium Usage
Business Insurance
Promotions
Club/Luxury Box
Premium Seat Revenues
Personal Seat Licenses
(Hunt, 2011)

Cap
Calculation
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Revenue
Sharing
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes/No
No
No
No
No
No

Allocation
40% Visitors
Evenly
Evenly
Situational
-

As indicated in the chart nearly every revenue figure has an affect on
the salary cap calculation for each team but only three revenues are
considered in revenue sharing: gate receipts (or ticket sales), broadcast
revenues, and NFL entity revenues. It is conventional among all four major
sport leagues to share the revenues from ticket sales; the NFL, though, does
require 40% of ticket sales to go to the visiting team. The NFL does not
require a sharing of other revenues, like merchandise sales, which can be
seen in other models. The broadcast and NFL entity revenues come from the
league. The NFL has deals with CBS and FOX to broadcast games. Naturally
the revenues from this deal and associated sponsorships are split among all
teams, as they all play on CBS and FOX. NFL entity revenue considers brand
licensing for many tertiary streams, such as NFL sponsored youth flag
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football. There is a large opportunity given to owners to maximize their own
unshared revenue streams, particularly after the 2006 collective bargaining
agreement.
When allocating shared revenues among teams, the NFL does not
consider the unshared revenues of teams, which are generally much greater
for large market teams. With the restructuring of the collective bargaining
agreement the NFL created a system called Supplemental Revenue Sharing
(SRS) to combat the uneven totals that have arisen from the freedom given in
unshared revenue generation. Supplemental Revenue Sharing has,
“redistributed revenue of $895 million over a six-year period from top 15
revenue clubs to weak small markets (Hunt, 2011).” This served as a start to
curve the inequities that may arise, but the issue is, in fact, that the SRS
numbers reflect revenues and not profits. NFL owners entertain the thought
that low revenue clubs may, actually, be more profitable than high revenue
clubs given a lack of certain financial restraints, like debt and lower facility
operational expenses. Profit shows true value according to some owners.
However, the NFL may have a point in using revenues for SRS instead of
profit because teams can use the creative accounting practices detailed
earlier to create additional expenses detracting from the team’s stated
profits.
Despite the potential manipulation under the SRS model, the NFL has
created salary cap restrictions to allow for more equitable competition for
signing players on the open market. These caps serve as a way for the NFL to
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control the monetary flow and leave less creativity in the hands of owners.
For the most part, the salary cap is the total amount teams have to work with
when signing players, making trades, and drafting rookies. The key, as
mentioned earlier, is creating a revenue sharing model where incentives for
investing in playing talent are at their highest. Generally, professional sport
fans are drawn to teams who win. Winning brings in increased ticket and
merchandise sales when the team has attractive talent or increased win
percentages. Therefore it is important for NFL teams to maximize the talent
they are able to fit into the cap in order to maximize unshared profits.
Components of player contracts that count against the cap are base salaries,
signing bonuses (which are apportioned over the life of the contract), and
incentives. If these incentives are likely to be earned they are counted
against the cap. (Gette, 1996).
The percentage of revenues shared is always under scrutiny during
collective bargaining discussions because players want teams to have a
larger portion of their revenues dedicated to player compensation. Owners
conversely are more concerned with finding the point Hunt discussed where
the teams maximize fan and team utility and profits.
Part of the salary cap and revenue sharing of particular concern in the
NFL during the latest collective bargaining agreement conversations was
affected by the reported team revenue figures. The NFL Players Association
(NFLPA) has aimed to receive additional compensation for medical coverage
of retired players. There are increased cited cases of brain damage within
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the retired football player community. The NFLPA aims to bring some
revenues to benefit these struggling individuals. The correct apportioned
total is unclear in this case when the owners misrepresent the revenue
figures to the NFLPA. This serves as one example of the effects stemming
from fiscal misrepresentation on the part of the owners in the NFL, whereby
revealing a greater picture of concern on the part of the NFLPA.
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NBA Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points
There is always uncertainty for players association in collective
bargaining agreements since the teams are private businesses and do not
need to report their financial statements to the government. As a result,
players and local governments wonder whether the owners are revealing
sincere financial instability or not. An interesting turn in the way the NBA’s
revenue sharing came as a result of the leaked financial documents for
several franchises including the New Jersey Nets (now the Brooklyn Nets)
and New Orleans Hornets (now the New Orleans Pelicans). This allowed for
a greater public understanding of how the revenue sharing model works and
the different accounting tactics employed by owners across the league.
Many similar accounting practices were discussed previously. The exposure
of NBA financial statements had particular implications to the use of player
depreciation by NBA owners.
The New Jersey Nets used player depreciation of roughly $25 million
as an expense in order to decrease shared revenues and tax obligation.
Tommy Craggs discusses the implications of this in his article by stating, “If
we're trying to arrive at [an] idea of how much money the Nets really made
in 2004, we'll need to…knock out the $25.1 million RDA (player
depreciation) (Craggs, 2011).” This is again because player depreciation is
an intangible, paper loss. Craggs continues, “…and add the $9.1 million in tax
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savings. Suddenly, [a] $27.6 million loss becomes a $6.6 million profit
(Craggs, 2011).”
This has been an important point in the NBA collective bargaining
conversations because David Stern has asserted that the NBA and its teams
are not running in the black. Stern uses this as a bargaining chip to keep
more revenue within the teams as opposed to increasing the players’ share in
profits. This may be a tricky way of viewing the overall financial wealth of a
team because a team should be considered for a sum of its parts. Similar to a
Ford motor plant, the motor division, exclusively, may have a negative
revenue total. If there were a claim Ford is losing money that wouldn’t be
sound. The motor plant sells the product at a price which enables Ford to
turn an overall profit when the final motor vehicle is sold. Upon every sale
value is created for Ford (Craggs, 2011).
This is an interesting point and shines a new light. Should teams be
strictly viewed as just the revenues and profits associated with the players
on the court or are their tertiary profits adding to the bottom-line and the
owners’ wallets? Craggs makes a valid argument that a company is a total of
all its parts, and should be viewed as such for many purposes and not just
collective bargaining agreements. To expand upon the Nets example and add
to Craggs point, the team can’t be valued without seeing the numbers for
other assets. This includes the recently opened Barclays Center (the Nets’
arena), and the remainder of the revenues associated with the development
of this new arena in Brooklyn. These associated revenues, because of the

31
holding company structure discussed earlier, affect the true value of the team
and should change the revenue sharing/salary cap models used in collective
bargaining agreements.
In addition, the players association had other qualms with how the
league portrayed their losses in collective bargaining agreement talks. In
preparation for the most recent collective bargaining conversations, the
league reported losses of $370 million, but ESPN compiled a team of financial
experts who were able to remove $250 million of the losses if player
depreciation and interest associated with purchases of teams was not taken
into account (Coon, 2012). When buying a team an ownership group and
their limited liability corporation generally borrow money in the form of a
loan. In 2009, for example, the New Orleans Hornets could have turned an
operating profit had they not mismanaged their loan system during their
transition from Charlotte.
Teams across the four sports often receive loans for the ownership
group governing them, however the interest is being paid to the owner. This
interest is seen as a profit for the owner of the team, but an expense and a
loss for the team. The question around interest expense is a tough piece for
players to swallow because teams are either mismanaging their loan system
or that system is purposefully being manipulated by the owners.
Further, as the players assert, they should not be burdened with the
costs associated with buying a team because when a team is sold the players
do not share in the profit. The players associations do not have a voice in
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management decisions and therefore feel they should not be hurt by the cost
of owners mismanaging team financials. This concern of the players grows
as owners are paying millions of dollars each year in interest to help cover
part of the team’s purchase, as the expense is spread over many years.
“While these are real obligations and represent real cash going out the door,
they relate to team ownership, in which the players do not share (Coon,
2012).”
Despite these demurs, the league proposed amendments under the
new collective bargaining agreement with increased revenue sharing and a
more stringent player cost containment. This would hopefully ensure the
league as a whole is profitable first and then spread the remaining funds to
small market teams to create more competitive balance. The players agree
with robust team revenue sharing, but the league’s proposal of player salary
cost containment wasn’t ideal for the players association (Coon, 2012).
Previously the NBA had a soft player salary cap that would only tax a team
slightly for going over. The league had hopes of creating a hard cap to lower
league-wide salaries.
After the 2009, 2010 labor negotiations an agreement was settled
with an emphasis on revenue sharing. The new model, featuring a complex
formula to shift financial wealth of big-market NBA teams to the league’s
most needy teams, was fully phased in during the 2013-2014 season and saw
a $140 million directed toward revenue sharing. This sum is compared to
just $16 million of revenue sharing in the previous plan (Lombardo, 2012).
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The NBA created this new system and their own original formulas
without following any other leagues’ models. With the new system the NBA’s
model requires teams to give a fixed annual 50% of total revenues less
certain expenses, including arena-operating costs, into a shared revenue
pool. Teams receive disbursements equal to the average team payroll for a
given season. When an NBA team contributes less than the league average
they are considered recipients; conversely large revenue teams who
contribute an amount exceeding the average pay into the fund received by
recipients (Lombardo, 2012). This revenue sharing model evidently reveals
the hope of the NBA to bring financial and competitive balance amongst the
markets.
Furthermore the NBA’s shared revenues include sums from league
revenues, such as national TV sponsorship, but the majority of shared
revenues come from local revenues. The bottom seven in terms of revenue
(the Milwaukee Bucks, Charlotte Bobcats, New Orleans Pelicans, Atlanta
Hawks, Minnesota Timberwolves, Detroit Pistons, and Memphis Grizzlies)
will receive a distribution on average of $16 million, which is an increase
from the just under $6 million maximum in the previous collective
bargaining agreement (Lombardo, 2012).
In addition, the NBA disregarded its old system of requiring teams to
meet business performance standards developed by a tertiary consultancy,
and now calls for small-market teams to generate a minimum of 70% of the
league averaged team revenue to receive the full benefits of revenue-sharing.
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This standard was created to keep teams from relying completely on shared
revenues. By generating a minimum of 70% of the league average, teams are
required to try and bring in revenue. Inversely, “Large-market teams must
generate 130 percent of the league wide team revenue average. Should a
team fall short of its expected revenue, it must make up the difference in its
level of contribution (Lombardo, 2012).” This new plan simplifies the
expectations, and in a way helps in ridding of some creative accounting
practices. If teams do not recognize enough revenues then team will not
benefit from revenue sharing. Even though teams can still manipulate
financials, this new system helps decrease the practices.
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MLB Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points
Major League Baseball has taken a different approach to revenue
sharing and player compensation than that of the NFL, with the updates to
the collective bargaining agreement starting in the late 1990s. This change
came about in 1996 mainly due to the dominance of the New York Yankees
and Atlanta Braves through the earlier part of that decade. This was seen as
an issue with the league’s competitive balance. The league took it upon itself
to create a system with higher competitive balance and, as a result, seven
different teams won the World Series after 1996 in a ten year stretch: Florida
Marlins 1997 & 2003, New York Yankees 1998-2000, Arizona Diamondbacks
2001, Anaheim Angels 2002, Boston Red Sox 2004, Chicago White Sox 2005,
and the St. Louis Cardinals 2006.
The collective bargaining agreement in 1996 sought to discourage
excessive spending by those teams who could afford it. The owners in the
MLB are known for spending exorbitant sums on free agent players, and this
collective bargaining agreement curved unnecessary inflation of star player
spending by large market teams. Unlike the NFL and NBA, the MLB does not
have a salary cap, but instead a competitive balance tax.
Developed in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement, a three-tier
tax system was developed when certain salary cap levels are breached. “The
three applicable tax rates under the 2007 CBA are 22.5%, 30%, and 40%. As
a general rule, a club’s applicable CBA tax increases one level for each
consecutive year its Actual Club Payroll is above the Tax Threshold,” which is
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set each year (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010). This discourages teams from
spending over the tax threshold year after year by increasing applicable tax
implications. The MLB system is different from the revenue sharing models
of other leagues. “This system is not designed to compensate weaker teams
in an attempt to ameliorate the risks associated with a large revenue gap.
Rather, it was designed to remedy any improper…treatment of salary terms
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).”
The interesting piece of the MLB system is that 75% of the monetary
stream created by these taxes goes to ancillary benefits for the players; a tax
provision created to restrict excessive player spending and send additional
funding to the players. This is an intriguing paradigm that exists for this tax
system in the MLB’s system.
Regardless, the remaining 25% stays with the MLB for an Industry
Growth Fund, which is designed, “to promote the growth of baseball in the
United States and Canada, as well as throughout the world… (Dietl,
Grossmann, & Lang, 2010)”
Similar to the NFL and NBA, MLB also has a revenue sharing model
amongst its teams to redistribute the “playing field.” This provision of the
MLB’s collective bargaining agreement suggests two main sources of
redistribution existing within the revenue sharing model: a base plan with a
central fund component and a Commissioner’s Discretionary Fund. The base
plan component was designed to ensure each club contributes 31% of their
net local revenues to a general pool, which is divided equally among all
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teams. Net local revenue is defined as, “Local Revenue (gross revenue from
all revenue areas like ticket sales, concessions, etc. minus Central Revenue,
which is national television and radio, etc.) minus Actual Stadium Expenses”
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010). Some owners have contention with this
system, however, because large market teams who generally contribute more
are distributed a sum equal to those who give less to the central fund. This
table shows the point taken by some owners,

Table 2: MLB Base Plan Redistribution: 31% Net Local Revenues.
Club
31% Contribution
New York
$62,800,000
Yankees
Florida Marlins
$27,000,000
Cleveland Indians $31,000,000
San Diego Padres $47,500,000
Total
$168,300,000
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010)

Distribution
$42,075,000

Club Status
Payor

$42,075,000
$42,075,000
$42,075,000
$168,300,000

Payee
Payee
Payor

The chart shows four teams as an example of the base plan
redistribution based on the 31% contribution from the team’s local revenues.
All four teams have different contribution totals because each team
throughout the entire league brings in different revenue amounts throughout
a given season. Despite the different contribution levels, all teams receive
the same redistribution of $42,075,000, which is the given year’s average
contribution. The difference, either a surplus or deficit, of contribution less
the distribution indicates whether a team is a payee or payor.
A large revenue team like the New York Yankees contributes over
double the amount of a small revenue team like the Florida Marlins and
receives an equal sum causing a loss in this regard for the Yankees. This is
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one main avenue Major League Baseball uses to create competitive balance
amongst its teams. As noted above, a club receiving a distribution greater
than their 31% contribution (i.e. Florida Marlins and Cleveland Indians in
this chart) has additional funds under the base plan.
The other main component of the MLB’s revenue sharing plan gives
the Commissioner control of a discretionary fund. This is supplemental
funding that upon special request can be given in a sum of no more than $10
million to a team, detracting from the central fund of the base plan that is left
over from revenue sharing (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010). Maintained
yearly, this discretionary pool, if not distributed, is returned in pro rate to all
clubs. “While the Commissioner is not required to satisfy distribution
requests, he is prohibited from allocating more than $3 million to any
individual club in a given year (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).”
In 2011 Bud Selig exercised his ability to act in the best interest of
Major League Baseball as he disbursed $25 million to the New York Mets’
owner Fred Wilpon (Shaikin, 2011). The aim was to help a team who had a
winning record in just over half of the 25 seasons during Wilpon’s
ownership, despite being in the largest market. Selig hoped for a reemergence of the Mets and a stimulus to the popularity of baseball in the
nation’s largest city.
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NHL Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points
The National Hockey League adds an additional ripple to the revenue
sharing and player cost constraint conversation with its Player
Compensation Cost Redistribution System (PCCRS). The stated goal is for
high-revenue clubs to redistribute a certain percentage of their revenues to
low-revenue clubs for player compensation. The NHL re-designed the
system to increase the ability of all teams to allocate a minimum of 25% of an
accepted team payroll range on player specific compensation (Dietl,
Grossmann, & Lang, 2010). Of all the salaries teams expense (coaching staff,
physical trainers, executives) the National Hockey League expects teams to
spend at least a quarter of revenues on player salaries. The NHL has
established four sources for the basis of the PCCRS; these are described in the
table below.
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Table 3: Four Funding Sources in the NHL
Funding Source
Central League
Revenues Phase

Percentage of
Commitment
Maximum of 25%
redistribution
requirement

Escrow Account

Up to 1/3 remaining
commitment

Playoffs Funding
Phase

50% remaining
commitment

Supplemental Phase

Remaining Amount

Explanation
If central league
revenues exceed $300
million, 50% of excess
may satisfy up to 25%
commitment
Amount from top ten
revenue clubs cover up
to 1/3 remaining
amount
Playoff teams
contribute % of playoff
tickets sold, depending
on revenue ranking
Funded by top ten
revenue clubs, based on
their revenue
compared to 11th
ranked revenue club

(Hunt, 2011)
The first phase of the PCCRS, Central League Revenues Phase, sets a
threshold of revenue that necessarily is met prior to triggering the sharing of
the phase. Once the central revenues, such as broadcasting and licensing
revenues, exceed the $300 million total in a year, half of the excess can help
teams satisfy the 25% requirement established above (Hunt, 2011).
The next phase, referred to as the Escrow Account, comes into play
after the Central League Revenues Phase if there is a remaining commitment
of teams to meet the 25% level of player compensation. It allows for 1/3 of
the remaining commitment to be redistributed. This is a back-up plan of
sorts where if the league-wide player compensation exceeds the targeted

41
share for player salaries, there is a redistribution commitment to maintain an
increase in competitive balance (Hunt, 2011).
The third source of funding comes from certain playoff revenues.
Playoff revenues are not always planned, as teams do not know if they will
make the playoffs. Therefore they are a throw in and owners have conceded
to sharing these additionally generated revenues. Regardless of the
redistribution from the first two phases, funding in this phase can cover 50%
of the remaining commitment of teams in the playoffs (Hunt, 2011). If teams
make the playoffs but are still unable to meet the 25% requirement, ticket
sales come to their aid in order to balance out salary related expenses. Based
on the level of revenue generation amongst playoff teams, there are varying
requirements for revenue sharing in phase three. These rules are shown in
Table 4.

Table 4: Calculating the redistributed playoff revenues in phase three
Revenue Ranking
Top 10 Gross
Preseason and
Season Revenues
Middle 10 Gross
Preseason and
Season Revenues
Bottom 10 Gross
Preseason and
Season Revenues
(Hunt, 2011)

Calculation of Playoff Distribution
50% total ticket value, net taxes, for one
full-priced, sold-out regular game
40% total ticket value, net taxes, for one
full-priced, sold-out regular game
30% total ticket value, net taxes, for one
full-priced, sold-out regular game

The final source of funding in the NHL’s PCCRS model is the
supplemental funding phase. This phase requires top-ten revenue clubs, on a
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percentage basis, to satisfy any remaining balance under the PCCRS 25%
commitment. Based on a formula related to revenue generation, those teams
are expected to help low revenue teams (Hunt, 2011). The formula compares
a team’s revenue value to the relative median and calculates the
supplemental funding. It ensures that the highest revenue clubs add in the
most revenue. There is a cap with two restrictions limiting the amount top
ten clubs are required to contribute. First a team is not asked to contribute
more than 20% of their revenues to the supplemental funding phase. Any
excess over this 20% is dispersed back to the top ten teams on a pro rata
basis. The second restriction makes certain no team’s revenue rank will be
altered as a result of the supplemental funding phase. If the team’s rank
would change, the contribution is capped that exact amount (Hunt, 2011).
These four phases help set the stage for revenue sharing and
therefore player compensation. Much like the other four leagues, the
discussion of expense consideration lends itself to creative accounting
practices by owners to control the amount they let the team share with
fellow franchises and players alike. In all four phases, top revenue teams are
asked to help stimulate low revenue teams. With this in mind small market
or low revenue teams may find complacency. There is no need to exert effort
to be a top tier team if they do not see the reward. Again the discussion
comes back to profit and utility maximization for owners. When the owners
see some form of taxation coming in their direction with marginal increases
in revenues, they will find ways to expense out revenues or limit revenue
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streams. The National Hockey League’s PCCRS, in a way, entices low revenue
teams to accept subsidies and not field competitive teams. This issue reveals
a need for the NHL to ensure a minimum amount spent on player talent.
Creative accounting practices can be seen across the NHL and one
such example exists in Philadelphia. Ed Snider, owner of the Philadelphia
Flyers, claimed a team loss of ten percent on the team revenues. However,
similar to the ownership structure of the New York Yankees and Cleveland
Indians (detailed on page 14 & 15), Snider owns Comcast SportsNet, the
broadcasting company of the Flyers, and Global Spectrum, the group who
operates the Flyers’ arena. The Flyers divert broadcasting revenues and pay
rent to Spectrum and claim rent expense, this is just shifting money from,
“one of Snider’s pockets to another (Elliott, 2004). The NHL has created a
unique revenue sharing model, but one that is still be manipulated by owners
for their own personal profits.
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Leveraging Public Interest
Aside from the player compensation and revenue sharing
conversations, owners also have an interest in creative accounting practices
in the interest of receiving public subsidies and aid from local governments.
As mentioned in the NFL section, there has been a stadium boom over the
past five to ten years. Owners have used the “need” for new stadiums or
renovations as a point of emotional leverage with the public in order to
receive public funding. This has become important for the big four leagues
because one major source of unshared revenues comes from luxury box, club
seating and personal seat licenses.
In order to maximize unshared revenues and personal profits on the
part of owners, there is a call for new stadiums to grow these types of
stadium seating structures. The main concern with this shift lays particularly
upon the notion that taxpayers have contributed the majority of funds to
stadium constructions.
As the new stadiums increase the percentage of high-priced seating,
there is a negative consequence where many of the taxpayers who help fund
these new stadiums are priced out of attending the games. If the local
taxpayers and governments do not financially support the new stadium,
teams often threaten moving to a new city, one that will aid in a new stadium.
Given this, the fans who are emotionally invested in their professional sports
teams and give money to fund the new stadiums are often the ones pricedout of the games. The situation becomes a “catch-22” for taxpayers and local
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governments. This point has been the start of the conversation on the
accounting and funding for new stadiums over the past ten years.
There was a period where teams were expected to find the majority of
funding for stadiums from private sources, whether that be from the owner,
team savings, or private-backers. However there has been a switch, as these
two examples indicate.
In Minnesota, the Vikings wanted a new stadium, and threatened to
leave. While the Minnesota legislature faced a $1.1 billion budget deficit, it
still extracted $506 million from taxpayers as a gift to the team. This help
with roughly half the cost of the new stadium (Easterbrook, 2013). This is a
prime example of how the Minnesota Vikings ownership leveraged their
importance in the Minneapolis market to receive a large handout from state
government who was already facing a staggering financial deficit.
The next example indicates how the City of Santa Clara is managing
the new stadium being built primarily for use by the San Francisco 49ers in
the 2014-2015 NFL season. In Santa Clara, California, the city broke ground
on a $1.3 billion stadium primarily for use by the San Francisco 49ers. The
deal officially includes $116 million in public funding, with private capital
making up the rest. However, a new government entity, the Santa Clara
Stadium Authority, borrowed roughly $950 million, largely from a
combination of financial institutions led by Goldman Sachs. This provided
the majority of the “private” financing. The board members of this new Santa
Clara Stadium Authority are the members of the Santa Clara City Council.
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This indicates, in effect, the city of Santa Clara is covering most of the
“private” funding. If something in the payment goes awry, it is likely the
taxpayers will take the hit. If a true private firm wanted to finance the
stadium construction that would be a viable solution, however in this
example members of the city council are making a deal with private capital
firms. If the group is not able to pay back the nearly $1 billion loan then it is
likely the public will have to pay it back through taxation.
The stories continue in NFL cities across the country, two such
examples are in Seattle and Pittsburgh. The Seattle Seahawks opened
CenturyLink Field in 2002, “…with Washington State taxpayers providing
$390 million of the $560 million construction cost (Easterbrook, 2013).” The
Washington taxpayers financed nearly 70% of the stadium, despite the
Seahawks being owned by Paul Allen. Allen is one of the richest people in the
world. The Seahawks payback the state roughly $1 million per year as a
tenant, “…in return for most of the revenue from ticket sales, concessions,
parking, and broadcasting (all told, perhaps $200 million a year). Average
people are taxed to fund Allen’s private-jet lifestyle (Easterbrook, 2013).”
The Pittsburgh Steelers serve as the next example. One of the most
storied franchises in all of America’s four major professional leagues, the
Steelers, who play at Heinz Field, have won six Super Bowls, the most of any
franchise. “Pennsylvania taxpayers contributed about $260 million to help
build Heinz Field—and to retire debt from the Steelers’ previous stadium
(Easterbrook, 2013).” Again even though the taxpayers funded a large
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portion to build the stadium the majority of game-day and television
revenues are directed toward the ownership, the Rooney family.
Additionally the Rooney family also retained $75 million that Heinz paid to
name the facility (Easterbrook, 2013).
Governments may argue that these are valuable investments, and this
is not unfounded. Professional sport teams are profit generators. However,
many of these investments come at a time when local and state governments
are cutting funding for education and health services among others. This is
demonstrated in the Cincinnati Reds’ new stadium where the sport-related
subsidies exceeded the amount cut from health and human services in
Hamilton County, Ohio (Easterbrook, 2013). If this was not bad enough for
taxpayers, the elevation in ticket prices associated with new stadiums
decreases the likelihood of the average taxpayers attending a game with their
family.
An interesting dimension to public subsidization of stadiums comes
when leagues and teams sign contracts for exclusive rights to license images
on game days. For example, FOX and CBS have the rights to broadcast from
NFL stadiums. In general, taxpayers have provided the majority of funds to
build NFL stadiums, and while teams pay local or state governments modest
rents, they retain exclusive rights to license theoretically public images. The
privatization and capitalization of public funds appears to be questionable
when the public sees no direct return on the “investment.” Judith Grant Long,
a professor of urban planning at Harvard University, has calculated taxpayers
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provide 70% of the capital cost of NFL stadiums; only the New England
Patriots, New York Giants, and New York jets pay 75% or more of their own
stadium capital costs. (Easterbrook, 2013).
Whether purposefully or not, local governments understand this
situation in professional sports and concede to the owners. Professional
sport teams are generally a loved aspect of cities; teams drive, among other
aspects, love for a city and tourism revenues. The teams help restaurants
and bars; local companies thrive because of the influx of foot traffic and eyes
on the games. Sports teams ideally can bring a large influx of dollars to a
metropolitan area. On average, fans view sports in terms of wins and losses,
championships won, and legendary players.
With an economic lens, though, professional sports teams appear to
be a “publicly subsidized business monopoly” (Eitzen, 2000). The NFL, NBA,
MLB, and NHL all exercise control of supply over their sports, with leagues
acting as a cartel of sorts as a group of competitors who control the entry and
exit of fellow members and join to create mutually beneficial economics.
This cartel structure reduces competition in geographical or market areas,
which would cost owners more money. There is control and regulation on
spending for services of talented players, acquisition of new talent through a
draft, and how many teams can be in a league and their location.
This brings about a question of legality. There have been several antitrust court rulings preventing professional sport leagues from being viewed
as monopolies. One such example is, “the 1961 Sports Broadcast Act allowed
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pro sport leagues to sell their TV rights as a group, without being subject to
U.S. antitrust laws (Eitzen, 2000).” As a result leagues are afforded the
opportunity to sell the rights to televise all of their games.
This sort of structure is ideal for owners because there are rare
additions into the cartel, making professional sports teams considered to be
scarce commodities. Economically such commodities appreciate in value
more rapidly than other investments. “In 1998, Forbes Magazine estimated
that the 113 professional teams in football, basketball, baseball and hockey
were worth an average of $196 million each — up from $146 million the year
before (Eitzen, 2000).”
The idea of scarcity for commodities has long been accepted as a
means of value appreciation in economics, marketing, and psychology. The
appreciation is applicable for ownership and fans. Time constraints and
high-values can influence the appreciation (Drexel University, 2005). It is
not often a team is sold, and this puts a time constraint pressure on potential
ownership groups. The groups have a perception of high-values associated
with the teams in ticket, merchandise, and sponsorship sales. This drives the
appreciation of team value year after year.
Fan psychology can also lead to team value appreciation. Live sport is
not renewable; sport is consumed the moment it is seen. Though fans can
watch a game on television or on replay, there is something special for fans
when attending a championship game or an important match against a rival
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side. The time constraint drives fans to consume these important moments,
raising the demand for tickets perceived as high-value.
Potential ownership groups and fan psychology are just two examples
of quick value appreciation. These compounded can show how the scarcity
of teams in the professional sport market drives sport commodities to
appreciate in value yearly.
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Tax Breaks and the Government Sweethearts
The stadium issues discussed previously are the most visible form of
public subsidization transferring into help for professional sports. However,
owners still maintain the financial difficulty of teams to keep public help
coming. The public continues to help professional sport teams’ owners
through tax breaks and “sweetheart deals.”
Owners see tax help in a bevvy of ways with their sports teams.
Professional sports teams exist as scarce commodities, which economically
speaking appreciate quickly. When a professional team is sold, the IRS sees
the profits for the owner as capital gains. Given the current tax code, lower
tax rates are applied to these profits than other sources of income. This
allows owners to turn a vast profit, while the teams are still seen as public
subsidies. Subsidies for stadium renovations help in this regard as well by
increasing the value of a team. The Cleveland Indians of MLB, for example,
had a market value of $81 million in 1993; the next year the team opened a
new stadium and the value climbed to $100 million. By the time the team
was sold in late 1999 the valuation climbed to $320 million; there was a
return of 295% in just seven years, meaning large capital gains for the former
owner (Eitzen, 2000).
The second tax benefit is a unique one that siphons money into the
pocket of owners, as an indirect benefit that has hefty tax implications. This
occurs, “when a business buys game tickets, stadium food, or seats in a
[luxury box], then hands them out to its favored patrons, it is allowed to
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write off half the cost as a business expense (Eitzen, 2000).” Writing off the
tickets as business expenses results in taxpayers covering a portion of the
cost of employees and business prospects attending sporting events.
Corporations are therefore inclined to continue to offer this perk because of
the tax write-off. This also helps maintain inflation of ticket and luxury box
costs. The indirect corporate subsidy, “alone costs the federal treasury more
than $80 million in lost tax revenue (Eitzen, 2000).”
Additionally, local governments continue the subsidization with
certain sweetheart deals, which serve as a tangible “icing on the cake.” These
sweetheart deals start with simple aspects like renovation and up-keep of
roads and parking lots necessary for fans to get to the games. Cities will
often times help owners with, “moving expenses, practice facilities, office
space, land, and special investment opportunities to entice them to stay or to
move their team to the city (Eitzen, 2000).” These are additional forms of
help afforded to owners in hopes of keeping teams in the city.
As discussed previously, the player depreciation has tax implications
as well, whereby allowing team owners to use these deductions as tax losses.
“No other business in the United States depreciates the value of human
beings as part of the cost of its operation (Eitzen, 2000).” It is interesting to
note despite owners writing-off player depreciation, players who diminish in
value are not able to have a personal tax write-off.
The tax breaks and sweetheart deals, discussed in this section for
owners, is just the tip of the iceberg. As detailed throughout the thesis, the
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current revenue sharing and player compensation models in professional
sports afford owners the opportunity to maximize personal profits at times
in spite of the implications for their teams. The models coupled with the
varying public subsidization avenues of the private sport industry reveals a
need for a solution to the creative accounting practices.
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A Potential Solution
There is a definite need to understand the true value of a team with
varied strategic accounting practices detailed throughout the previous
sections of the thesis,. When discussing collective bargaining agreements,
the implications on revenue sharing and player compensation, owners are
guarded. This appears to be a natural business mindset. Owners want to
protect and retain as much of the revenue created by their teams, assets, and
associated companies as possible. As shown through the questionable
accounting practices regarding revenue and expense reporting, players are
unable to see the true value of teams and the overall financial wealth of the
league. This is critical to understand when calculating a fair level of player
share in league profits.
Additionally, owners leverage the emotional and economic
importance of teams to increase the value of teams and, in turn, increase the
revenue siphoned into their pockets. The public and local governments
deserve to know the true value and worth of professional sport teams. This
understanding is especially important, when these parties are directing
millions of tax dollars for stadium construction and sweetheart deals; as well
as giving owners tax breaks, which could instead help raise revenues for the
state and municipalities to offset the cost of stadiums. If states across the
board created a uniform stance when it comes to professional sport teams,
then owners wouldn’t have as much leverage; these teams could bring
additional revenues to their cities.
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This is not the current reality, however, nor is it on the horizon. Given
this situation, wouldn’t it be appropriate for taxpayers and local
governments to expect a certain level of transparency or understanding in
the valuation of the teams who ask a great deal, in monetary terms, from
them? This appears to be a pivotal question for now and in the future.
Every year, Forbes Magazine attempts to calculate team valuations.
They paint a picture of teams valued upward of billions of dollars. The
magazine is said to use a variety of calculations in their valuations, including
sponsorship, fan reach, and associated business. This evidently paints a
different picture than the one that league executives reveal to players when
collective bargaining agreement time comes. Forbes claims to use a full
picture approach, but seems to overstate the bottom-line of a team.
Getting close to a true idea of where a team is in a given year is
important for players, taxpayers, and local governments alike. Nearly every
professional sports team in America is a private entity, however, there is no
requirement for a release of financials, which would give the full picture of
true team wealth. As a result, the public should use certain sets of data that
are available year after year to calculate percentages like player
compensation caps, revenue sharing, taxation, and public subsidies.
A constant struggle for owners is maximizing fan interest while
simultaneously maximizing team revenues. The largest expense for teams,
based on league standards, is player expense. Therefore there is an
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important question of how can a team structure their player salary levels in
order to fit the needs of their fans?
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Method of Using Ticket Sales
The thesis attacks this question in three professional leagues, Major
League Baseball, National Basketball Association, and Major League Soccer.
Ticket sales figures are made public after games, as are player salaries at the
end of each season. These are critical in solving the concurrent maximization
of team allotment for player salaries and ticket sales. The hope is for owners
to use this quantitative analysis as a potential means of increasing efficiency
within their teams and, in turn, relax their creative accounting practices. The
increased team-spending efficiency will allow owners to turn greater team
profits.
This thesis gives a proposition to utilize ticket sales figures as a means
to figure a better picture of the inancial status of teams. Given the
assumption that teams spend a relatively equal percentage on utilities and
ancillary expenses in relation to the size of their stadium, ticket sales can
indicate fan and business interest in a team for a means of valuation.
A regression analysis was used to test how fans of different teams in
different leagues respond to the standard deviation of salaries on a team. Do
fans increase their ticket spending when there are a few All-Star players on a
team and lesser-paid role-players, i.e. the Miami Heat, to fit in under the
salary tax? Or do fans like a balanced budget approach? Or is the salary
dispersion of a team inconsequential to fans?
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These questions led to the testing payroll information’s affect on
attendance. From the seasons of 2001 to 2012 information from the MLB,
MLS, and NBA was taken to understand a potential relationship. Total
payroll, average salary, median salary, standard deviation of salary, the top 3
players’ salary, and the sum of those three players’ salary were calculated
based on figures provided on the websites of USA Today, the Washington
Post, InsideHoops, MLS Players, and bigapplesoccer.com. The aim was to
provide regression analysis from the NFL as well but there wasn’t enough
complete information available for the NFL salary and attendance figures.
The attendance figures of games played, total attendance, average
game attendance, and percentage of stadium filled, as well as those same
figures for home and away games were calculated based on figures provided
on the websites of ESPN and kenn.com (for the MLS information).
Additionally in order to paint a better picture of each city’s economic
landscape, total population and per capita personal income figures were
retrieved from city-data.com. Population and income help provide additional
information on potential other factors in attendance change. Generally there
would be an expectation that with higher population and income ticket sales
would increase as well.
The information gathered from these sites allowed for a regression
analysis to be run testing attendance as the dependent variable against
independent variables of payroll and salary distribution or deviation on a
team. The standard deviation of salary was used as the measure of salary

Comment [RP1]: Should explain that the
standard deviation of salary was used as the
measure of salary dispersion. The greater
the standard deviation, the larger the gap
between the highest and lowest paid
players.
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dispersion on the team. High standard deviation reveals a team who pays
large amounts to a few players, and then less to the rest of the team. A low
standard deviation is found on the team with evenly dispersed payment to
players. There was additional testing performed with population and income
serving as added independent variables to create a more complete picture,
but they do not serve as the focal point of this analysis.
The results of the regression analysis can be seen at the end of this
section and reveals interesting information about the fans of each major
league with differing result patterns for each. The most important findings to
take away from the regression analysis, for the purpose of this thesis, are the
t-statistic for PAYROLL and STDEVSAL. These values, in relation to 0,
indicate how responsive fans/attendance can be to changes in payroll and
the deviation, dispersion, of salary amongst teammates. The further away
from 0 in a positive direction, especially greater than 2, indicates a strong
relationship between the stated independent and related dependent
variable; inversely, a negative indicates an indirect relationship. A brief
explanation of the results for each league can be seen after the regression
results for that respective league.
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MLB Regression Analysis
Quantitative Regression Analysis of MLB Attendance and Payroll 2001-2013
Dependent Variable: Attendance
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

C
Population
Income
Payroll
Standard
Deviation Salary

916560.6
0.122383
2.826280
0.021436

1.209182
1.346091
0.198790
10.29479

* (statistical
significance)
0.2277
0.1794
0.8426
0.0000

-0.224718

-4.713254

0.0000

R-Squared-

0.818312

The regression of the MLB points to the notion that fans will increase
their spending and interest in a team the larger the payroll becomes as
indicated by the t-statistic being upwards of a value of 10 with a substantially
strong probability. However, the fans do not respond to the spending on
particular players. Their interest does not rest upon having the top all-star
players on the roster, which can be attributed to the fact that baseball
requires more players than say the NBA or MLS to have a successful team.
Not only does a team need the starting nine players for baseball, but also a
pitching rotation with depth is key for success. This is an interesting take
where fans appreciate team spending but do not necessitate spending a large
sum on particular players, where role players take a salary hit in order to
afford those All-Star talents.

61

MLS Regression Analysis
Quantitative Regression Analysis of MLS Attendance and Payroll 2004-2013
Dependent Variable: Attendance
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

C
Population
Income
Payroll
Standard
Deviation Salary

188303.0
0.000842
0.961730
0.004404

2.113468
0.244287
0.429049
0.308251

* (statistical
significance)
0.0373
0.8076
0.6689
0.7586

0.048536

0.474912

0.6360

R-Squared-

0.10585

The MLS fans seem to take a different stance than those of the MLB
and NBA. As evident by the low t-statistic values neither payroll spending
nor the deviation of salaries among players has a strong effect on fan
attendance. This is an important note to MLS owners because it shows
investment in high-priced talent is not necessary for their fan bases. Instead,
owners may want to focus their spending on the fan experience, affording
fans entertainment at half time or creating marketing schemes for certain
games as drivers, which would increase attendance.
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NBA Regression Analysis
Quantitative Regression Analysis of NBA Attendance and Payroll 2001-2012
Dependent Variable: Attendance
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

C
Population
Income
Payroll
Standard
Deviation Salary

576641.9
0.007188
-0.413848
0.001256

17.66363
2.439626
-2.506924
2.147202

* (statistical
significance)
0.0000
0.0153
0.0127
0.0326

0.010040

1.590261

0.1128

R-Squared-

0.165464

The NBA regression analysis shares a similarity with the MLB in that
their fans respond to more spending on the team as a whole. The NBA fan
differs from those in the MLB in that there is more responsiveness to a roster
with increased standard deviation. This supports the general trend in the
NBA to sign two to three All-Star caliber talents in order to drive not only fan
support but also wins. The Boston Celtics signed three star talents in Kevin
Garnett, Ray Allen, and Paul Pierce and stood atop the league as champions.
The Miami Heat were next with signing LeBron James, Chris Bosh, and
Dwayne Wade and have won two championships to this point. Not only is
signing all-stars and filling the remaining space in the cap with veteran role
players a championship winning formula, but it seems to also help in
garnering fan support and ticket dollars.
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This regression approach can be expanded upon if owners gave full
transparency to merchandise sales and television ratings in addition to ticket
sales. Owners can use the model to understand the responsiveness of their
fans as a means to be equitable to their players, taxpayers, local
governments, and fans. This can breed increased spending efficiency and
less of a need for creative accounting practices that come with ethical
questionability.
The regression model serves to help expand revenues for owners, but
it does not necessarily give owners an incentive to stop their creative
accounting practices. Though not perfect, thisThe model gives owners a
potential solution to how teams could spend their salary-designated dollars
without “bending” the rules. With a greater emphasis on revenue generation,
as detailed in the regression, teams and leagues could rely less on
government subsidies. However, in the long run the government and
taxpayers would need to lead in the elimination of the creative accounting
practices.
The regression highlights the differences and preferences across the
MLB, MLS, and NBA, but is not a creative accounting solution. Instead, the
goal of the analysis is to give insight on revenue generation to help teams if
rules change in relation to creative accounting or public subsidies. This
model helps to provide an alternative to the creative accounting practices,
but unless owners are required to stop the practices by the government, it is
unlikely to see any change.
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Concluding the Journey
The goal of this thesis was a simple one with complicated avenues:
explore the accounting practices of owners in professional sports. These
practices have current relevance as all the major professional sport leagues
in the United States have restructured their collective bargaining agreements
in the past five years. Owners create personal salaries, broadcasting rights,
and contracting fees, among others, to increase operational expenses. These
practices aim to increase their personal profits with little regard for shared
revenues and players’ deserved shares. Additionally, the practices have
important implications for the everyday Americans as taxpayers. Owners
leverage taxpayers’ emotional ties to teams for public subsidization of their
private teams. Furthermore, nearly every state government supports the
professional sport teams in their region. Given this, the thesis aimed to
investigate and propose a potential solution to the creative accounting
practices of professional sport team owners.
The first step was a discussion on the accounting practices used by
professional sport owners, the structuring of the big four professional sport
leagues, and how they govern revenue sharing and player compensation in
their leagues. The NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL all differ slightly in the
structures of percentages shared among teams and this affects the way
players are paid. Some of the leagues have a hard cap that sets a maximum
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that teams can spend on their rosters; others have soft caps, when breached
bring tax revenues to the league for further sharing. With revenue sharing
and salary capping, leagues aim to create competitive balance and maximize
league-wide popularity and profitability. Even as this is the goal for all four
major professional leagues, the one common thread running through all of
the major sport leagues is the issue of owners attempting to hide or expense
out their revenues. This creates the most personal profit possible but in the
end skews the valuation of these teams and detracts from league-wide
competitive balance. Understanding the value and bottom line of teams is
important when players look for fair compensation and ancillary benefits,
such as medical coverage, for all players, current and former.
The next piece of the thesis explored several examples on how owners
leverage the perceived, emotional and financial, importance of the team to a
given city to extract as much public, monetary subsidization as possible.
Traditionally sport teams were privately funded entities, however, owners
have been able to shift funding to public sources by, often times, threatening
a city move if their requests were not obliged. The use of public funds for
stadiums has seen a drastic increase since the turn of the century across the
country, generally during periods of education and human services cuts.
Owners used their similar creative accounting practices in these cases to
plead their team’s financial instability as a means to receive public
subsidization. Generally, local governments not only yield to these requests
but also make it highly profitable for owners of sport teams. Through tax
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breaks and sweetheart deals there is an “icing on the cake” for owners to
maximize their private profits on a publicly subsidized business. Aid in
constructing and revitalizing stadiums coupled with tax breaks and
sweetheart deals, have increased owners’ personal profits exponentially
without requiring the amounts to be shared with taxpayers or local
governments.
With these practices in mind, this thesis proposed an alternative to
curve the need for the commonly detrimental creative accounting practices.
Utilizing ticket sales as a potential important variable, owners can create
more efficient cost structuring. If owners can increase their efficiency in
player salary structuring, there is less of a need to use questionable
accounting practices. The practices serve to increase their personal profits,
but this regression model can step in and serve as a replacement.
Even though ticket sales were used as the tested variable in the
regression, team owners could also use this model with merchandise and
sponsorship sales figures to focus on how player salary spending affects
these revenue streams as well. Ultimately, this shift would be realized only if
owners were required by the government and taxpayers to halt their creative
accounting practices.
Taxpayers and local governments should call for a regulation and shift
in creative accounting practices. By using fan interest as an indication of
team values, players, taxpayers, and local governments can start to better
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understand the value of a team when calculating percentages of revenue
sharing and aid given to the owners of professional sport teams.
The thesis sought to not only explore the current state of accounting
practices in America’s professional sports, but also open the eyes of the
public and hold owners accountable when claiming financial instability on
teams generating massive private revenues.
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Appendices
MLB Regression Results
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 07/28/13 Time: 06:22
Sample: 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 28
Total panel (balanced) observations: 308
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
POP
INC
PAYROLL
STDEVSAL

916560.6
0.122383
2.826280
0.021436
-0.224718

758000.6
0.090917
14.21739
0.002082
0.047678

1.209182
1.346091
0.198790
10.29479
-4.713254

0.2277
0.1794
0.8426
0.0000
0.0000

Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.818312
0.790308
330920.0
2.91E+13
-4329.023
29.22073
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

2458517.
722656.4
28.38326
28.89191
28.58665
1.197885
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MLS Regression Results
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/28/13 Time: 06:28
Sample: 1 96
Included observations: 96
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
POP
INC
PAYROLL
STDEVSAL

188303.0
0.000842
0.961730
0.004404
0.048536

89096.72
0.003448
2.241538
0.014287
0.102199

2.113468
0.244287
0.429049
0.308251
0.474912

0.0373
0.8076
0.6689
0.7586
0.6360

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.105859
0.066556
87935.25
7.04E+11
-1226.549
2.693407
0.035780

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

260277.8
91016.23
25.65727
25.79083
25.71125
0.981936
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NBA Regression Results
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/28/13 Time: 06:33
Sample: 1 305
Included observations: 303
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
POP
INC
PAYROLL
STDEVSAL

576641.9
0.007188
-0.413848
0.001256
0.010040

32645.71
0.002947
0.165082
0.000585
0.006314

17.66363
2.439626
-2.506924
2.147202
1.590261

0.0000
0.0153
0.0127
0.0326
0.1128

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.165464
0.154262
87158.56
2.26E+12
-3874.189
14.77112
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

704816.1
94774.63
25.60521
25.66649
25.62973
0.595741

